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Since 2013, combat services have been increasingly exchanged on the market for force. This 
development is puzzling since the practice emerged despite an anti-mercenary norm 
banning such services, and without any revision of the norm. The article argues that the 
combat market is not a deliberate design, but the result of strategic interaction. While for 
some violating the anti-mercenary norm is the best strategy, compliance is the best for 
others. However, once the norm violation occurred, it is in the interest of all actors to keep 
a compliance façade. Non-compliant actors benefit from the combat services, and 
compliant actors do not have to engage in costly sanctioning of the norm violation and avoid 
the reputational costs associated with non-enforcement. The article employs game theory 











In February 2018, operators of a Russian private military and security company (PMSC) 
attacked a U.S. military outpost in Syria. The event was a strong indication of a 
significant development: combat services are frequently and regularly exchanged on 
the market.1 The exchange of combat services is surprising as it runs counter to an 
established norm—the anti-mercenary norm. The norm reflects a longstanding 
aversion—going back at least to the beginning of the 19th century—of international 
society to private force providers.2  
Violations of the norm are not a new phenomenon. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
when groups of mercenaries were participating in civil wars in Congo and Angola, an 
extensive international debate developed. As a result, the UN General Assembly and the 
UN Security Council issued several resolutions condemning the practice, describing 
mercenaries as dangerous criminals. At the same time, the international community 
started to develop the UN International Convention against Recruitment, Use, 
Financing and Training of Mercenaries and the Organization of African Unity 
Convention on Mercenaries.3 Similarly in the mid-1990s—when the market for force 
experienced a quantum leap, turning into a corporate market, and PMSCs provided 
combat services on a highly professional level—international and national actors 
criticized the practice immediately.4 Some considered corporate actors to be different 
from mercenaries, while others deemed them to be the ‘new mercenaries’.5 However, 
it was not the corporate structure or the legal contractual relations that provided the 
differentiation between illegitimate mercenary and legitimate activity. It was the type 
of service that made the difference. Any actor, be it an individual, group of corporation 
was considered to be a mercenary if they provided offensive combat services. PMSCs 
therefore did ‘not entirely escape the anti-mercenary norm’ if they offered such 
services.6 However, as long as they provided defensive services only, even in a conflict 
zone, their activities were considered to be appropriate and not in violation of the anti-
mercenary norm.  
This has been reflected in the 2008 Montreux Document.7 With 54 members to 
date, the agreement enjoys wide support within the international community, including 
major international actors which are home to the largest PMSC markets, e.g. the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, South Africa, and Germany, as well as 
states that have been significantly affected by armed security providers, e.g., Sierra 
                                                        
1 Mark Galeotti, Moscow's Mercenaries in Syria, 2015, www.warontherocks.com.  
2 Janice Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, & Sovereigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
3 Sarah Percy, 'Mercenaries: Strong Norm, Weak Law', International Organization, 61, 4 (2007), 367-
397, 373-374. 
4 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation  (London: 
2002); Foreign Affairs Committee, Memorandum from Armor Group Services Limited, Appendix 6 
(London, 2002); Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on Blackwater USA (2. 
October) (Washington, D.C.: 2007).  
5 Peter Singer, ‘Corporate Warriors’, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2003). Juan Zarate, “The 
Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private Security Companies, International Law and New World 
Disorder, Stanford Journal of International Law 34, (1998), 75-165. 
6 Sarah Percy, Mercenaries: The history of a norm in international relations  (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 242. 
7 Ulrich Petersohn, 'Reframing the anti-mercenary norm: Private military and security companies and 
mercenarism', International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis, 69, 4 (2014), 475–493. 
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Leone, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Angola. Accordingly, while security providers remained 
in business, combat providers disappeared again.8 In contrast, the most recent re-
emergence of combat contractors did not cause any debate or reshaping of the anti-
mercenary norm. The manuscript sets out to investigate the question: why is there an 
active market for combat services, despite the presence of an anti-mercenary norm?  
 
The article will argue that the combat market is an institution that did not emerge 
through a deliberate process, but rather as an unintended consequence of strategic 
interactions among states. The investigation will proceed in two steps. In the first step, 
the existence of a combat market will be demonstrated. The claim that there is regular 
and frequent exchange of combat services requires corroboration. In the second step, 
the exchange of combat services on a market despite the presence of an anti-mercenary 
norm will be explained. As will be demonstrated, the most likely theoretical 
explanations—a transnational coalition of actors campaigning for the exchange of 
combat services, or a broad international discourse on the legitimacy of private combat 
services—fail to account for the re-emergence of combat providers.9  
The article, in contrast, will draw on game theory. An institution is considered 
to be a self-enforcing pattern of behaviour (equilibrium). The combat market emerges 
as stable through several sequential games. In the first—the norm compliance game—
market actors decide whether to comply with or defect from the anti-mercenary norm, 
i.e. whether to trade defensive or offensive services. As the benefits of compliance and 
non-compliance are distributed unevenly on the market, an equilibrium emerges with 
a larger group complying and a smaller group defecting. However, it is not until the next 
subgame that the equilibrium becomes stable. In the norm enforcement game, 
compliant actors have the ability to increase the cost of defection through punishment. 
However, punishment is costly for punishers as well, hence compliant actors would 
prefer to avoid enforcing the anti-mercenary norm. Although tempting, this strategy 
can turn out to be costly, as non-enforcement may be observed and sanctioned by an 
international audience. Once the norm violation has occurred, compliant and defecting 
actors have a similar interest: to not draw attention from their audience. Accordingly, 
both actors tacitly collude and take actions to maintain a compliance façade.10 As a 
consequence, the combat market emerges as a stable self-enforcing equilibrium.   
In order to test the validity of this theoretical argument, the congruence method 
will be employed. This method emphasizes consistency between precise theoretical 
predictions and actual observable outcomes.11 This method lends itself to testing game 
theory arguments because the underlying calculations of actors cannot be directly 
                                                        
8 Percy (2007), 227. 
9 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, 'International norm dynamics and political change', 
International Organization, 52, 4 (1998), 887-917; Elke Krahmann, 'From 'Mercenaries' to 'Private 
Security Contractors': The (Re)Construction of Armed Security Providers in International Legal 
Discourses', Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 40, 2 (2012), 343-363.  
10 Austin Carson, 'Facing Off and Saving Face: Covert Intervention and Escalation Management in the 
Korean War', International Organization, 70, 1 (2015), 103-131, 105.  
11 Alexander George & Andrew Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences  
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 67-72, 181-204. 
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observed, while the associated behaviour can. The closer the predicted and the 
observed patterns match, the higher the likelihood of the theory being valid.  
 
A combat market for force 
The article puts forward the claim that a combat market has been established since 
2013. In general, a market institution is a stable and persistent pattern of behaviour 
(self-enforcing equilibrium) organized around social factors such as rules.12 Market 
exchange in general is governed by rules; it is a two-way voluntary transfer of services 
or goods for money.13 Hence, what remains is to demonstrate the regularity in exchange 
behaviour. Regularity requires a ‘degree of repetition over a period of time’ between 
the same or different actors.14 Table 1 outlines the different combat contracts. The table 
does not present a sample of contracts, but is as comprehensive as possible and 
includes the entire population of known combat contracts since 2013.15  
Table 1: Combat Contracts  
No. Location  Parties to the 
contract 
Purpose Size & Equipment Year 











2 Syria Russian government 
& Wagner Group 
(Moran Security 
Group) 
Fighting in support 
of Syrian gov.  
250-900 operators, 




3 Syria Russian government 
& Slavonic Corps 
(OMS) 





4 Ukraine Russian government 
& Wagner Group 
(Moran Security 
Group) 







5 Libya Russian 
government, 




Fighting in support 












forces & fighting in 
203 operators, three 
helicopters 
2019- 
                                                        
12 James Morrow, Order within anarchy : the laws of war as an international institution  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 6. 
13 William Jackson, 'On the social structure of markets', Cambridge Journal of Economics, 31, 2 (2007), 
235-253. 
14 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst's modern introduction to international law 7th rev. edition,  (London; New 
York: Routledge, 1997), 41. 
15 Given that confidentiality is in the nature of the combat market, it is possible for a few cases to be 
missing. Libya was not included. There was too little corroboration of Gaddafi hiring foreigners to fight. 
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& Wagner Group 
(Moran Security 
Group) 
support gov. of 
Mozambique 
7 Libya UAE & foreign pilots Fighting in support 






8 Yemen UAE & subsidiary of 
Northrop Grumman  
Fighting in support 
of Yemeni 
government 




9 Yemen UAE & Academi or 
Reflex Response 
Fighting in support 
of Yemeni 
government  




10 Yemen UAE & Spear 
Operations Group 







11 Yemen Saudi Arabia & 
foreign operators 







In 2013, the Nigerian government hired a company called Specialized Tasks, Training, 
Equipment, and Protection (STTEP) to support its combat operations against Boko 
Haram. Around 100 contractors were involved in direct combat, provided air support, 
and participated in night raids.16 The second, third, and fourth contracts were cases 
where the Russian government hired different PMSCs such as  Moran Security and OMS 
‘to engage in the fighting in Syria and the Ukraine.’17 The contracts were of substantial 
size, ranging from 200 to 900 operators, including heavy weapons operators.18 The fifth 
contract was between the Wagner Group and either the Russian government or 
Moscow-backed Libyan General Haftar (Tobruk government) to provide military 
support to fight against the government in Tripoli. The Wagner Group deployed around 
200 operators, including highly-skilled snipers. It has also been reported that Russian 
support included fighter jets and artillery, yet it is unclear whether this was through 
the Wagner contract.19 Contracts seven, eight, nine, and ten were UAE contracts. The 
UAE provided air support in 2015 and 2016—including aircrafts, pilots, and actual air 
strikes—to the Tobruk government in Libya. Several of the pilots flying combat sorties 
were foreigners.20 Moreover, the UAE had two contracts in 2010, one with Northrop 
Grumman and one with Reflex Response (R2) to build an 800-member battalion of 
                                                        
16 Jack Murphy, Eeben Barlow Speaks Out (Pt. 1): PMC and Nigerian Strike Force Devastates Boko Haram, 
2015. www.sofrep.com; Peter Fabricius, Nigeria's decision to use ex-SADF soldiers to combat Boko 
Haram will further aggravate sour relations between the two countries, 2015. www.issafrica.org.  
17 The Interpreter, St. Petersburg Sends Contractors to Syria, 2013, www.interpretermag.com; Thomas 
Grove, Up to nine Russian contractors die in Syria, experts say, 2015; The Economist, How Wagner came 
to Syria, 2017.   
18 John Sparks, ‘Russia's Secret Soldiers Fighting in Syria  (Sky News, 2016); Pierre Vaux, Fontanka 
Investigates Russian Mercenaries Dying For Putin in Syria and Ukraine, 2016. 
19 David Kirkpatrick, 'Russian Snipers, Missiles and Warplanes Tyr to Tilt the Libyan War', The New 
York Times, November 7 2019; Sudarsan Raghavan, 'Arrival of Russian merceanries adds deadlier 
firepower, modern tactics to Libya's civil war', Washington Post. (Washington). November 6 2019. 
20 Arnaud Delalande, Erik Prince's Mercenaries Are Bombing Libya, 2017, www.warisboring.com.  
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foreign troops to conduct ‘urban combat’ and to destroy enemy equipment and 
personnel.21 The unit was deployed in 2015 to participate in the fighting in Yemen. 
Finally, UAE contracted with Spear Operations Group, a private military company based 
in the U.S. which provided approximately ten former special operations forces 
operators to train UAE armed forces in counter terrorism and to carry out targeted 
assassinations in Yemen.22 There is only sparse information on the eleventh contract. 
In this case, Saudi Arabia hired several hundred foreign fighters to participate in the 
fight in Yemen.  
This history shows that combat contracting is not an insignificant event nor a 
random norm violation. On the contrary, contracting combat services is a regular 
occurrence, and the contracts are significant in size. In total, eleven combat contracts 
were identified between 2013 and 2019, with nine contracts running across multiple 
years. Hence, from 2013 on, a persistent pattern suggests the existence of a combat 
market for force.  
 
Theoretical considerations 
Crucial to this investigation is the fact that theories of normative change and emergence 
differ in the extent to which they emphasize intentional agency, i.e. whether an agent 
deliberately creates a specific outcome or whether the outcome is spontaneous and 
unintended. At one extreme of this spectrum, hegemonic theories consider the 
influence of agency to be very high on the final outcome. Powerful actors deliberately 
choose and authoritatively implement rules to maintain and exert their power. At the 
other extreme are evolutionary theories, which deemphasize agency and intentionality. 
Norms may develop independent of a deliberative process through natural selection 
pressures, historical path dependency, or are shaped by psychological factors.23 Two 
prominent and widely-applied theories are located in the middle ground in terms of 
intentionality and influence of agency on the outcome: the plural politics approach and 
the communicative action approach.  
The plural politics approach is one of the most influential theoretical perspectives in 
explaining the emergence of norms. It argues that norm entrepreneurs, such as states, 
transnational, or international organizations, intentionally seek adjustment or 
institutionalization of a norm. In order to achieve their goals, they form coalitions to tip 
the balance in favour of their campaigns. Depending on the ability to form alliances, the 
balance will shift in favour of changing or establishing the norm.24 However, in the cases 
                                                        
21 Mark Mazzetti & Emily Hager, 'Secret Desert Force Set Up by Blackwater's Founder', New York Times, 
May 14 2011, 1; Emily Hager & Mark Mazzetti, 'Emirates Secretly Sends Colombian Mercenaries to 
Yemen Fight', New York Times, November 25 2015, 1.  
22 Aram Roston, A Middle East Monarchy Hired American Ex-Soldiers To Kill Its Political Enemies. This 
Could Be The Future Of War, 2018, www.buzzfeednews.com.  
23 Ann Florini, 'The Evolution of International Norms', International Studies Quarterly, 40, 3 (1996), 
363-389; Douglass North, Understanding the process of economic change  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2005); Jennifer Ramos, Changing Norms Through Action  (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013). 
24 Finnemore & Sikkink ‘International norm dynamics’. 
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at hand, neither has there been a campaign, nor has a coalition been formed tipping the 
balance in favour of combat services. Alternatively, the communicative action approach 
proposes that norms are developed through public discourse.25 While the assumption 
of agency is still high, the intentionality of the outcome is more limited because the 
outcome is not under the control of any individual actor or group. It is the result of a 
collective process. Actors holding a variety of motivations, ideas, and arguments enter 
into discourse with each other. Their different positions are then pitted against each 
other, and multiple factors—e.g. resonance with normative structure, instrumental 
considerations, truthfulness or the communicative power of actor—decide which 
actors are successful. In short, normative ‘change depends on the ensuing arguments.’26 
However, the approach runs into difficulty explaining the existence of the current 
combat market, as its explanatory leverage stems from the analysis of the dynamics of 
the discourse. First, in the case of the current combat market, no discourse changed the 
parameters under which force can be exchanged. None of the actors on the combat 
market made a deliberate attempt to trigger a discourse and seek to amend or change 
the norm.27 Second, even though actors might not have wanted a discourse, choices 
routinely generate disputes over rules. If a rule collides with particular actions, a 
dispute should be triggered, i.e. compliant actors should demand an explanation or 
exert pressure.28 However, in stark contrast to previous decades, there was no 
widespread outcry about the current practice.  
 
Why is there a combat market despite the anti-mercenary norm? 
The argument here is that the current combat market is not an intentional design, but 
rather the consequence of strategic interactions. Game theory offers a powerful tool to 
explore strategic interaction, and how such interactions—either intended or 
unintended—develop into a self-enforcing equilibrium.29 The basic assumption of 
game theory is that actors are cost-benefit calculating. Hence, actors’ moves are 
constrained by rationality and they will always pick the option offering the best 
possible payoff. However, the outcome is not determined by unilateral action but by 
interaction, i.e. the best reply to another actor’s actions. If both actors find a mutual best 
response from which they cannot improve unilaterally, and they decide to repeat this 
interaction, a self-enforcing (Nash) equilibrium emerges. They can formalize the rules, 
making the rules of the game explicit, or they can be informal and tacit.30  
                                                        
25 Thomas Risse-Kappen et al., The power of human rights: international norms and domestic change 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 11; Wayne Sandholtz & Kendall Stiles, International 
norms and cycles of change (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 14-15. 
26 Thomas Risse, '"Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics,' International Organization, 
54, 1 (2000), 1-39.  
27 There were two exceptions: Simon Mann suggested to form an ‘Arab Legion’ to fight ISIS, and Erik 
Prince proposed a private multi-national force. Both proposals failed 
28 Sandholtz & Stiles (2009), 6-10. 
29 Edna Ullmann-Margalit, The emergence of norms  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977); Avner Greif & 
David Laitin, 'A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change', The American Political Science Review, 98, 
4 (2004), 633-652. 
30 Douglass North, Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance  (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3. 
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Sceptics might have reservations about the approach’s ability to explain the 
existence of two contradictory equilibria, e.g. the combat market and the anti-
mercenary norm. However, it may be less fruitful to ask whether an institution or norm 
is self-enforcing in general, but rather for whom it is self-enforcing. To be more specific, 
norms often have different payoffs for different actors within a given community. 
Payoffs can be distributed asymmetrically.31 The underlying assumption is that 
international norms create an order yielding better payoffs for some than for others. 
This creates different groups within the international society. Satisfied states support 
the current order as it is constructed in a way to yield high payoffs and helps them to 
achieve their goals. However, that order also produces dissatisfied states. 
Dissatisfaction is derived from their disadvantageous position under the current rules 
yielding low benefits. 32 Accordingly, there are those whose best strategy is to comply 
with the anti-mercenary norm (H-doers) as this promises substantial payoffs, while for 
others the best strategy is to unilaterally defy the anti-mercenary norm (L-doers) as 
this promises better payoff.33 In terms of the stability of the order, some level of 
defection can be sustained as long as the group of L-doers is small and the group of H-
doers remains large. The asymmetric payoff structure has direct relevance for the 
argument about the emergence of the combat market. It is the unintentional outcome 
of the best strategies between the H- and L-doer groups which yields the combat 
market. To be more precise, it is the interaction of the two actors’ best strategies: the 
H-doers move in the compliance subgame, followed by the L-doers moving in the 
compliance subgame, and finally the H-doers move in the enforcement subgame.34 
 
                                                        
31 T. K. Ahn et al., 'Asymmetric payoffs in simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma games', 
Public Choice, 132, 3 (2007), 353-366. 
32 Susan Sample, 'Power, Wealth, and Satisfaction:When Do Power Transitions Lead to Conflict?', 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 62, 9 (2018), 1905-1931, 8 & 23; Ronald Tammen, 'The Organski Legacy: 
A Fifty-Year Research Program', International Interactions, 34, 4 (2008), 314-332, 317-318. 
33 The acronyms were taken from Diego Gambetta & Gloria Origgi, 'The LL game: The curious 
preference for low quality and its norms', Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 12, 1 (2012), 3-23. ‘H’ 
indicates high, and ‘L’ indicates low compliance.  
34 Players act rationally in every subgame, i.e. the game is subgame perfect. Kenneth Williams, 
Introduction to game theory: a behavioral approach, Oxford; Oxford University Press, 144 
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Norm compliance subgame 
 
In the norm compliance subgame, members of the H-doer group move first. In theory, 
they have the option to comply or defect. However, compliance with the normative 
order yields a high payoff for H-doers. Hence, they are satisfied with it and seek to 
facilitate its stability. Compliance with the anti-mercenary norm is therefore a rational 
move. While hiring violent non-state actors has certain benefits—such as providing a 
maximum of freedom and a minimum of responsibility—it also has costly 
repercussions as it renders state relations less predictable and stable due to more 
adventurous foreign policy.36 In the worst case, it could be difficult to determine who 
initiated and authorized forcible PMSC intervention. Overall, the lack of accountability 
and unpredictability may lead to diplomatic tensions, or worse, it might trigger war and 
increase overall violence.37 In essence, as norms require a substantial amount of 
                                                        
35 Game theory depends on ordinal preference orders. The individual scores are for illustration purposes 
only. 
36 Deborah Avant, 'The Marketization of Force: Adventurous Defense, Institutional Malformation, and 
Conflict', Jonthan Kirshner (ed.), Globalization and National Security (New York: Routledge, 2006), 105-
141, 116; S. Schooner, 'Why Contractor Fatalities Matter', Paramenters, Autumn (2008), 78-91.  
37 Ulrich Petersohn, 'Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), Military Effectiveness, and 
Conflict Severity in Weak States, 1990–2007', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61, 5 (2017), 1046-1072. 
 10 
compliance to yield positive effects, the defection of H-doers would mean the end of the 
anti-mercenary norm due to the size of the group. The negative repercussions of 
instability and unpredictability for the H-group would be substantial as indicated by 
the payoff of Outcome B (Figure 1). Constrained by rationality, H-doers will therefore 
not opt for defection as it would be irrational. Hence, H-doers are expected to comply 
with the anti-mercenary norm. 
Following this, L-doers are ready to move. L-doers have the option of 
compliance or non-compliance with the anti-mercenary norm. However, while 
compliance would contribute to the overall public good of stability and predictability, 
the benefits for the L-doers are small (Figure 1, Payoff A). The current order either 
disadvantages L-doers or makes the opportunity costs of compliance too high, 
rendering L-doers dissatisfied with the international order. The latter will mainly apply 
to states which face an internal military challenger and which are under threat for 
regime survival. Accordingly, L-doers are expected to respond with non-compliance. 
Theoretically, L-doers have two options to defect from the norm:  
 First, the L-doers’ dissatisfaction with the normative order may prompt an 
intentional norm challenge. In other words, the L-doer turns into a norm-entrepreneur. 
A norm challenge is indicated by the L-doer, making its violation public in order to 
trigger negotiations about the order and eventually re-shape the rules of the game. 
Accordingly, the violation is accompanied by a justification as to why the norm was 
violated and an offer to other actors to change the current order. Whether the offer is 
accepted depends on the offer made by L-doers. The offer (x) can range from 0 (L-doer 
receives all benefits) to 6 (payoff for H-doers as if status quo remains and actors comply 
with the anti-mercenary norm). It can be assumed that any offer less beneficial to H-
doers than the status quo minus the enforcement costs will be rejected.38 If the offer is 
above this threshold, H-doers may accept and both parties may benefit (Figure 1, Payoff 
G). If, in contrast, the offer does not resonate with H-doers, they will seek to maintain 
the status quo and take costly enforcement actions (Payoff F). While norm challenge is 
a theoretical possibility, there are currently no attempts by any actor to challenge or 
initiate negotiations.  
Second, L-doers may violate the norm in order to gain higher payoffs from the 
violation. Instead of a negotiation game, this defection-move triggers a norm 
enforcement game. H-doers may then decide to punish L-doers by imposing costs, such 
as economic sanctions, or social sanctions, such as blaming and shaming. The goal is for 
the costs to significantly exceed the benefits from non-compliance, forcing L-doers into 
compliance (Figure 1, Payoff E). However, this is not a likely move as H-doers have a 
strong incentive to not pursue L-doers aggressively, as dealing punishment is 
associated with substantial costs. For one, the punisher accrues direct costs from 
coordinating and adjustment costs, i.e. the formation and negotiation of a sanctioning 
alliance. For instance, in the case of the Syrian war the European members of the UN 
                                                        
Ulrich Petersohn, ‘The Impact of Mercenaries and Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) on 
Civil War Severity between 1946 and 2002’, International Interaction 40, 2 (2014),191-215. 
38 Andrew Kydd, International relations theory : the game theoretic approach  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 59; H-doers may accept offers which are >4 (6[status quo]-2[enforcement 
costs]). 
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Security Council sought to find a consensus for a resolution to condemn human rights 
violations and establish an arms embargo. However, despite substantial effort in 
drafting different versions of the resolution and intensive negotiation with other 
Security Council members, the initiative failed.39 Furthermore, costs arise from 
implementing and monitoring sanctions. Lastly, imposing punishment may have 
repercussions on relations between sender and recipient, as the latter might adopt a 
more antagonistic stance in other issue areas. As a result, the preferred strategy for H-
doers is to defect in the norm enforcement game. This leaves both groups of actors 
better off as opposed to norm enforcement (Payoff C).40  
However, whether non-enforcement or enforcement is the best strategy for H-
doers depends on parameters external to the interaction. In other words, ‘the best’ is 
always in reference to a set of stable parameters, and changes in such parameters may 
change what is considered the best strategy. For instance, power changes exogenous to 
the interaction may shift an actor’s best bargaining strategy.41 In the game at hand, the 
external parameter influencing the choice of strategy is the level of attention by an 
external audience. An audience can influence an actor’s strategy by highlighting or 
publicizing non-compliance or non-enforcement. The publicity exploits the political 
vulnerability of actors committed to a norm. Actors are sensible to their transgressions 
being made public, as that publicity will likely generate domestic and international 
reputational costs about the credibility of their commitments.42 Accordingly, if public 
attention is high, H-doers are expected to enforce the norm as it is less costly than non-
enforcement (Figure 1, Payoff E over D). However, the attention the audience pays to 
similar events varies.43 Hence, one combat contract may receive attention while 
another does not. Accordingly, any defection by L-doers contains an offer to H-doers to 
collude in minimizing public attention and maintaining a compliance façade. Tacit 
cooperating to maintain a compliance façade is in the interest of H-doers as it promises 
a higher payoff.  
Against this backdrop, the preference order of L-doers is C=D>A=B>E. The 
preference order of H-doer is A>C>E>D>B.44 While there are theoretically five 
outcomes possible, the argument is that the outcome is either C or E, depending on the 
level of audience attention. If public attention is low, C is the preferred outcome by both 
parties. If public attention is high, E is the preferred outcome of the H-doer, who makes 
the last move. Accordingly, in order to create the circumstance under which H-doers 
are able to collude and Outcome C is possible, L-doers engage in activities maintaining 
                                                        
39 What’s in Blue, ‘Syria Sanctions Resolution’, Security Council Report, 25 August 2011. 
40 Robert Axelrod, 'An Evolutionary Approach to Norms', American Political Science Review, 80, 4 
(1986), 1095-1111, 1098; Daniel Drezner, The sanctions paradox: economic statecraft and international 
relations  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 34, 41.  
41 Avner Greif, Institutions and the path to the modern economy: lessons from medieval trade  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 159, 164. 
42 Martha Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond borders: advocacy networks in international politics  
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), 24; James Fearon, 'Domestic Political Audiences and the 
Escalation of International Disputes', The American Political Science Review, 88, 3 (1994), 577-592., 
580-581. 
43 Nils Weidmann, 'A Closer Look at Reporting Bias in Conflict Event Data', American Journal of Political 
Science, 60, 1 (2016), 206-218, 211. 
44 The pathway ‘defection and offer to reshape’ has not been included in the analysis.  
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a compliance façade, e.g. concealing activities, denial, or rhetorical action to keep public 
attention low (Prediction 1). While C is not the preferred outcome of H-doers (A is at 
the top of the preference order), it is preferable to E. Hence, H-doers will reciprocate by 
engaging in activities maintaining a compliance façade, e.g. denial or rhetorical action 
(Prediction 2). If H- and L-group members collude in this manner, an unintended stable 
equilibrium forms, i.e. the combat market for force (Outcome C).45  However, if the 
audience is attentive, costs of non-enforcement increase. Under these circumstance, H-
doers will not collude as non-enforcement would be punished by the audience, 
resulting in Outcome E. L-doers would be content with E as they would receive the 
benefits of defecting from the norm and not getting punished.  However, H-doers prefer 
E over D, as the costs are less in the former. Accordingly, the prediction is that H-doers 
will break the compliance façade and enforce the norm if public attention is high 
(Prediction 3).  
 
 
Testing the Prediction 
A crucial assumption is that the current normative order yields an asymmetric payoff 
structure, dividing actors into those who are satisfied and those who are dissatisfied. 
For the purpose of the investigation, it is important to identify the group of dissatisfied 
states—and, by extension, potential L-doers—independent of their norm defection. 
The assumption here is that dissatisfaction follows from lower payoffs received from 
the current order. Two indicators will be employed to determine dissatisfaction.  
First, the literature has developed several indicators to measure 
dissatisfaction.46 For the purpose of this investigation, dissatisfaction is identified by 
proximity to the values upon which the system rests or the actual accrued costs 
associated with norm compliance. To be more specific, states follow their interest in 
forming international regimes and what treaties they enter into.47 Dissatisfied states 
will therefore refrain from entering into any agreements or regulatory regimes not 
associated with positive payoffs. Accordingly, for the investigation at hand, 
membership in the Montreux Document will be taken as an indication of being satisfied 
with the current order.48 Alternatively, the membership in the UN Convention against 
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries could have been selected as 
an indicator for satisfaction with the order. However, although the treaty addresses the 
organization of the use of force by private actors, it does not reflect a widespread 
consensus. Although it has been adopted almost 20 years prior to the Montreux 
document, it has gathered fewer members.49 Moreover, in contrast to the Montreux 
                                                        
45 There are other possible equilibria. 
46 Ronald Tammen et al., 'Foundations of Power Transition Theory', in Oxford Research 
Encyclopedias(Oxford University Press, 2017); Michael F. Altfeld & Bruce de Mesquita, 'Choosing Sides 
in Wars', International Studies Quarterly, 23, 1 (1979), 87-112.  
47 Abram Chayes & Aantonia Handler Chayes, 'On Compliance', International Organization, 47, 2 (1993), 
175-205, 179.  
48 Please see Appendix 1.  
49 The UN Convention was adopted in 1989 and it has 36 members (2020). On average 1.2 states joined 
per year. The Montreux document was signed in 2008 and has currently 56 members. On average 5 
states joined per year. 
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document, none of the members of the UN convention are ‘crucial actors’, i.e. none of 
the members have a significant PMSC industry. Lastly, the convention seeks to 
criminalize any participation or attempted participation in hostilities by private actors. 
This deviates substantially from the current consensus, which only considers offensive 
participation problematic.50   
Second, dissatisfaction with the order may result from norm compliance 
generating large opportunity costs. In the case of commercial combat providers, 
opportunity costs increase if there is a significant domestic threat and if the state is 
incapable of addressing that threat by deploying its own armed forces or drawing on 
resources of state allies.  
According to Prediction 1, L-doers engage in activities to maintain a compliance façade. 
H-doers, in turn, tacitly collude with L-doers and engage in similar activities in 
maintaining the compliance façade (Prediction 2). In both cases, actors may undertake 
any of the following actions: conceal the activity, which is indicated by secrecy; 
retreating from the discourse, which is indicated by an absence of press statements 
mentioning the PMSC employment; denial and rhetorical action, which is indicated by 
either contradicting the credibility of factual statements, or framing the violation to be 
in accordance with the existing norm.51 For the H-doer group, the focus here will be on 
the reactions of several important members of the Montreux Document: the United 
States, South Africa, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).   
As suggested by Predictions 2 and 3, the level of audience attention is decisive as to 
whether enforcement measures are implemented. However, different authors have 
conceptualized attention in different ways suggesting that it is multidimensional. In 
order to capture this complexity, the investigation includes the three main dimensions 
of attention: elite attention, media attention, and public attention.52 The level of elite 
attention is determined by the absence of presence of reports by the UN Working Group 
on the Use of Mercenaries. Media attention is measured by the frequency of published 
newspaper articles on the specific subject, and public attention is captured by the 
frequency of Google search hits. In regards to the latter two indicators, high public 
attention is determined by comparing the hits in each case to an incident of 
exceptionally high public interest: the Nisour-Square incident in 2007 in Iraq. In this 
incident, operators of the U.S. PMSC Blackwater killed seventeen Iraqi civilians. 
However, Blackwater received unique and exceptional global attention, which needs to 
be taken into consideration. Accordingly, high interest is assumed if a case receives 
50% (or more) of the Nisour-Square interest, while anything below is considered as 
                                                        
50 Lindsey Cameron, ‘Private Military Companies: their status under international humanitarian law 
and its impact on their regulation’, International Review of the Red Cross 88, 863 (2006): 573-598. 
51 Frank Schimmelfennig, 'The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern 
Enlargement of the European Union', International Organization, 55, 01 (2001), 47-80; Lee Seymour, 
'Let’s bullshit! Arguing, bargaining and dissembling over Darfur', European Journal of International 
Relations, 20, 3 (2014), 571-595. 
52  W. Lance Bennett, ‘Towards a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States’, Journal of 
Communication 40, no. 2 (1990): 103-125; James Fearon,’ Domestic Political Audience and the 
Escalation of International Dispute, American Political Science Review 88, 3 (1994): 577-592. 
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low interest.53 The following sections test these predictions in several combat 
contracts. 
 
Nigeria and STTEP 
The Nigerian government has struggled with an insurgency on its own territory since 
2004. Since 2009 the intensity of the fighting, territorial losses, indiscriminate violence, 
and the number of displaced increased, amounting to a significant threat to the 
government. With the Nigerian military ineffective due to years of decline and 
corruption, the opportunity costs of complying with the anti-mercenary norm and 
forgoing the hiring of combat PMSCs were high. Accordingly, in 2013, the Nigerian 
government tasked a PMSC called STTEP to train the Nigerian military and to engage in 
direct combat, provide air support, and execute night raids.54 However, the Nigerian 
government had no interest in challenging the anti-mercenary norm and engaged in 
rhetorical action to keep a compliance façade as Prediction 1 suggests. They did not 
deny the existence of the contractual relationship nor the exchange of force-related 
services. However, when elaborating on those services, a representative of the 
company focused on the training task in order to maintain the impression of acting in 
accordance with normative requirements.55 Likewise, Nigerian officials emphasized 
the legitimacy of the contract and placed the exchange within the boundaries of the 
security market for force. Mike Omeri, a government official, denied that foreigners 
provided military services to the Nigerian government. Nigerian President Goodluck 
Jonathan was more detailed and described the operators as ‘technicians’ performing 
maintenance and instruction services, although they were actively participating in 
hostilities. Rear Admiral Gabriel Oki, the chief of Nigerian defense intelligence, 
emphasized the foreigners were not there to fight, but to train the Nigerian army.56  
This offer to collude was accepted by the H-doers due to the minimal 
international attention (Prediction 2). First, the UN Working Group did not mention 
Nigeria-STTEP in any of their reports, and did not bring it to the attention of the General 
Assembly. Likewise, the media reporting was negligible. A Nexis search yielded only 
seventeen reports. The low media interest is underscored by the results of a Google 
search, which yielded only 162 results and represents a low level of interest. Second, 
the international community’s response was mute. There was no official statement by 
the U.S., South Africa, the UK government, or by NATO on the topic. While Nigeria and 
Boko Haram was brought up in a German government press conference, the 
spokesperson did not mention any mercenary activity.57 However, a South African 
government official, the spokeswomen for the South African Defence Ministry, 
                                                        
53 A ‘Nexis’ and Google search for reports on each case was conducted for the period 2013 to 2019. The 
search for the term ‘Blackwater’ yielded 465 results on Nexis, and 677 on Google. 
54 Caroline Varin, 'Turning the tides of war: The impact of private military and security companies on 
Nigeria’s counterinsurgency against Boko Haram', African Security Review (2018): 1-14, 6. 
55 Fabricius, 'Nigeria's decision to use ex-SADF soldiers to combat Boko Haram'. 
56 Sani Tukur, 'Nigeria denies hiring mercenaries to fight Boko Haram', Premium Times. (Abuja). March 
16 2015; Chris Stein & Mike Eckel, 'VOA Exclusive: Nigeria Brings S. African, Foreign Mercenaries Into 
Boho Haram Fight', Voice of America, 2015.  
57 Bundesregierung, Regierungspressekonferenze vom 6. Juni 2016, 2014.  
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commented on STTEP. When asked about the topic, she denied any knowledge of 
STTEP operating in Nigeria, thereby contributing to the maintenance of the façade.58 
The empirical results therefore support Predictions 1 and 2. L-doers defected 
and maintained a compliance façade. Likewise, H-doers did maintain the compliance 
façade and did not impose sanctions due to low audience attention. The interaction of 
the two strategies yields Outcome C.  
 
Russia in Ukraine and Syria 
In Syria and Ukraine, Russian PMSCs engaged in combat operations on behalf of the 
Russian government. In Syria, the Slavonic Corps (a subsidiary of the Russian-based 
security company Moran Security) operated briefly in 2013. Currently, between 100 
and 900 Russian private military personnel from the Russian company OMS (also 
known as the Wagner Group) are participating in the fight. The Wagner Group was also 
engaged in operations in Ukraine on behalf of the Russian government to support the 
separatists from 2013-2015.59 In terms of payoffs, there were no significant 
opportunity costs by complying with the anti-mercenary norm. Russia has substantial 
military capabilities and did not face any significant domestic threat. However, Russia 
is often considered to be dissatisfied with the current international order in general. 
For instance, it displays a significant distance from the dominant liberal values of many 
H-doers60 and, specific to this case, it is not a member of the Montreux Document.  
As suggested by Prediction 1, Russia defected and engaged in rhetorical action 
while not drawing attention to its norm violation. For one, Russia took extensive 
measures to keep the entire operation secret and out of the public debate. For instance, 
the private soldiers of the Slavonic Corps were told not to bring any military-related 
articles to avoid attention and, upon their return to Russia, they had to surrender their 
SIM cards and electronic media to the Federal Security Service (FSB) and sign a non-
disclosure agreement.61 Moreover, the Russian government refrained from providing 
any information about the involvement of Moran Security or OSM in Syria. They either 
refused to directly comment on any relationship to a Russian PMSC or denied having 
any information available on the Slavonic Corps. Likewise, representatives of Moran 
Security and the Slavonic Corps denied involvement. OSM has not engaged in any public 
discourse and has pre-empted any questions by keeping its contact details undisclosed. 
The Russian defence ministry refuses to respond to any inquiries about the relationship 
and involvement of the company, and the Russian military does not acknowledge the 
existence of the Wagner Group. Moreover, a Russian government spokesperson 
deflected news reports about the Wagner Group as untrustworthy.62 
                                                        
58 Carien du Plessis, 'Arrest SA 'mercenaries' on Boko Haram mission - Mapisa-Nqakula', City Press, 
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61 The Interpreter, 'The last Battle of the 'Slavonic Corps',  www.interpretermag.com, November 16, 
2013.  
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In both cases international interest was high. A Nexis search yields 180 articles 
mentioning the Syria-Russia contract and approximately 320 dealing with the Ukraine-
Russia contract. The high interest is underscored by an analysis of the Google search 
results which produced around 500 hits. In addition, several in-depth journalistic 
pieces on Syria and the Russian practice of using private combat providers were 
published.63 Even the UN Working Group took notice of the Russian practice. A 
delegation visited Ukraine and produced a report pointing out the participation of 
Russian operatives, their recruitment in Russia, and various human rights violations.64 
However, in contrast to Prediction 3, the high public attention triggered only scant 
criticism and did not lead to sanctions imposed on the norm violator. Indeed, in 
Ukraine, some H-doers broke the compliance façade by criticising the deployment of 
PMSCs. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office criticized the presence of mercenaries 
in Ukraine, and Germany repeatedly called upon the Russian government to withdraw 
their mercenaries.65 However, this was the exception rather than the norm. No other 
actor raised criticism, and in Syria H-doers even tried to diffuse attention by casting 
doubt on the link between Russia and the PMSCs. For instance, a DoD spokesperson 
stated that U.S. military officials had been in contact with their Russian counterparts, 
who assured them that no Russian paramilitaries were in the region.66 U.S. Secretary of 
Defense James Mattis insisted he did not know whom the U.S. air strikes had hit, and 
that he believed that Russia would have informed the U.S. government if they had been 
involved.67 In short, while there was some criticism, the main thrust of the efforts was 
aimed at diffusing public attention. Moreover, the sanctions imposed were not designed 
to enforce the norm, but to rebut any allegations of non-enforcement. The measures 
targeted not the norm violator Russia, but the PMSCs. For example, Moran Security, 
which is registered in the British Virgin Islands, was sanctioned by the UK for its 
involvement in the Syrian conflict. Likewise, Wagner Group founder and leader Dmitry 
Utkin was added to the list of officials sanctioned for involvement in Ukraine conflict by 
the United States.68 The absence of sanctions against Russia directly avoided the costs 
associated with coordination, monitoring, and (further) disrupting diplomatic 
relations.  
In sum, the empirical results support Prediction 1 but not Prediction 3. While L-
doers defected and maintained a compliance façade, some H-doers did criticize the use 
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of combat providers, while most efforts sought to diffuse public attention. However, all 
H-doers avoided sanctioning the norm violator Russia. Accordingly, outcome E—where 
H-doers pay enforcement costs and L-doers receive a hefty penalty for the norm 
violation—did not materialize. Instead, the interaction produced an outcome not yet 
accounted for by the game matrix. In terms of payoff the unaccounted outcome is much 
closer to C than to E. The L-doer was able to keep the benefits of the norm violation, and 
H-doers avoided the costs of non-sanctioning imposed by the audience and the costs of 
sanctioning the violator at the same time.  
 
 
UAE in Libya and Yemen 
In 2010, the UAE government hired Reflex Response (R2) to establish an 800-member 
battalion of foreign troops to conduct ‘urban combat’ and to destroy enemy equipment 
and personnel.69 The unit was deployed in 2015 to participate in combat in Yemen 
within the military operation led by Saudi Arabia. Around the same time the UAE was 
involved in the Libyan civil war, providing air support for the Tobruk government, 
including aircraft, pilots, and air strikes. One of the main contractors supporting UAE 
special operations in Libya was an American business man named Erik Prince. Several 
of the pilots flying combat sorties were reportedly employed by him.70 The UAE did not 
face any significant opportunity costs by forgoing combat providers as it was not 
confronted with any domestic challengers. However, the UAE is categorized as a state 
dissatisfied with the current organization of the use of force. It does not align with the 
dominant liberal values and is not a member to the Montreux Document.  
In both cases the communication strategy was as expected (Prediction 1): L-
doers sought to maintain the compliance rhetoric. The New York Times reported the 
UAE’s plans and the involvement of Reflex Response in setting up a special battalion in 
2011.71 In response, Faiza Patel, then-chairperson for the UN Working Group, sent a 
questionnaire to the UAE embassy regarding the laws regulating PMSC activities. The 
UAE embassy sought to conceal the true nature of the activities by explaining that ‘no 
military companies using mercenaries’ were used, and insisted PMSCs were ‘limited to 
preventive security protection.’72 R2 did not engage in the discourse at all and did not 
issue any statements. Erik Prince, who reportedly helped to facilitate the contract, 
denied involvement. His spokesperson, Kathy Daneman, also denied and explained that 
‘[n]either Mr. Prince nor Blackwater are doing or have done security with the UAE … 
All reports to the contrary are in error.’73 The Libya contract displayed the same 
pattern. When news of UAE involvement broke, Libya’s ambassador to the United 
Nations sought to diffuse the situation by claiming that outside support was involved 
in his country. Likewise, the foreign minister made it clear that his government did not 
want any foreign military intervention, and the Libyan prime minister called the 
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allegations ‘false events.’ Similarly, Erik Prince denied any involvement in the air 
operations. Finally, the UAE government did not provide any comments on specific 
matters, yet the UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs said the claims about the attacks were 
a ‘diversion’ from Libyans’ desire for stability.74 
Overall, the audience’s attention to both contracts was rather low. Although the 
UN Working Group took up the UAE-Yemen issue briefly, it was not followed up or 
referred to in any meetings of the UN Human Rights Council. Media reporting on the 
topic was low as well. A Nexis search yielded around 50 newspaper articles covering 
the R2 contract. Google generated 194 search results which represents a low level of 
interest. Interest in the Libya case was also low. Nexis held only twelve reports, and a 
Google search yielded no results,. This is a very low level of interest. As a consequence, 
the audience cost for not sanctioning the other actors was low. Accordingly, there was 
no official statement by the U.S., German, South African, or UK government, or by NATO 
on the topic.  
The empirical results support Predictions 1 and 2. As expected, L-doers defected 
and maintained a compliance façade. Likewise, members of the H-group maintained a 
compliance façade and did not impose sanctions due to low audience attention. The 
interaction of the two strategies yields Outcome C.  
 
Conclusion 
Janice Thomson’s claim ‘[t]oday real states do not buy mercenaries’ needs to be 
revised.75 Indeed, a large part of the international community has accepted a regulated 
and restrained security market for force and has vehemently rejected attempts to re-
establish a combat market several times in the past decades.76 Nevertheless, the combat 
market re-emerged.   
Theoretically, the article argues that the combat market is the unintended 
outcome of strategic interaction between actors, who are satisfied and dissatisfied with 
the order. Dissatisfied actors are disgruntled due to the lower payoff they receive. 
Accordingly, for those actors it is more beneficial to defect. Satisfied actors, in contrast, 
are content with the order due to the higher payoff they receive and their best strategy 
is to comply. Compliant actors may choose to enforce the norm, yet this is a costly 
undertaking and will only be the best strategy if the audience’s attention is high and 
non-enforcement accrues a penalty. If public attention is low, L-doers engage in 
activities to maintain a compliance façade (Prediction 1). H-doers will join L-doers in 
keeping that compliance façade (Prediction 2). If both actors collude in this way, the 
interaction yields a self-enforcing equilibrium, the combat market (Outcome C). 
However, if attention is high, the expectation is that H-doers will take enforcement 
measures (Prediction 3).  
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In sum, two theoretical predictions are congruent with the empirical evidence. 
As assumed, in all of the cases, the defecting actors were dissatisfied with the current 
order due to lower payoffs. Prediction 1 holds up to the empirical test. Any defection is 
accompanied by L-doers seeking to maintain a compliance façade. Similarly, Prediction 
2 was corroborated. Whenever the audience’s attention was low, H-doers refrained 
from norm enforcement and maintained a compliance façade. However, in the case of 
the Russian contracts in Syria and Ukraine, high attention did not lead to the expected 
criticism or to sanctioning behaviour. While this contradicts Prediction 3, a closer look 
reveals that the result is still within the scope of the game theory model. H-doers sought 
to attain the best payoff by avoiding costly enforcement measures and costs from non-
enforcement at the same time. The overall results support the argument of the combat 
market being an unintended consequence. It is the result of the interaction of both 
actor’s best strategies by either colluding in maintaining a compliance façade, or H-
doers seeking to avoid costs of enforcement and of non-enforcement. In either case, the 
non-punishment by H-doers permits L-doers to continue to contract combat providers.  
An objection to the validity of the results may be that, due to space constraints, 
only seven out of eleven combat contracts were investigated in detail. However, it 
seems unlikely that four additional cases would change the results: Saudi Arabia 
worked alongside UAE in Yemen and public attention was low. It is unlikely that Saudi 
Arabia received criticism for its action while the UAE did not. The UAE-Spear 
Operations Group contract was one out of three contracts for the Yemen operation. It 
is unlikely that the UAE was not criticized for the two, yet was for the third. Lastly, to 
date the Russian contracts in Libya and Mozambique have not received any 
international outcry or criticism. However, admittedly, knowledge about Russia’s 
involvement is still very recent, and this may change in the future. Nevertheless, since 
no substantial enforcement measures have been taken in previous Russian contracts, it 
is unlikely this will be different.  
The result has also wider implications. If a norm gets violated, the literature 
tends to discuss two stylized outcomes: either compliant actors uphold the norm 
through sanctions forcing the violator to change behaviour, or the norm violator 
becomes a (illiberal) norm entrepreneur, engages in a discourse and persuades others 
to adjust the norm.77 However, the findings here suggest that there is a third option. 
Tacit collusion may be the best strategy for both actors saving sanctioning costs for the 
H-actors and the costs of norm adjustment for the L-actor. However, according to 
conventional wisdom, repeated norm violations and a lack of enforcement measures 
weakens the salience of a norm.78 Surprisingly though, the literature is divided about 
the repercussions of the current trend on the strength of PMSC regulation. Despite the 
presence of combat service exchange, Deborah Avant considers the current trajectory 
of regulation as a positive development increasing the ‘chances of effective 
                                                        
77 Carmen Wunderlich, ‘Rouge States as Norm Entrepreneurs’ (Cham: Springer 2020); Alan Bloomfield, 
‘Norm Antipreneurs and Theorising Resistance to Normative Change’, Review of International Studies 
42 (2016): 310-333; Keck & Sikkink, ‘Activists beyond Borders’. 
78 Ryder McKewon, ‘Norm Regress: U.S. Revision and the Slow Death of the Torture Norm, International 
Relations 23, 1 (2009): 5-29; Diana Panke & Ulrich Petersohn, ’Why International Norms Disappear 
Sometimes’, European Journal of International Relations 18, 4 (2012): 719-742. 
 20 
governance.’79 Elke Krahmann, in contrast, points out that much of the hope for 
regulatory effectiveness depends on market actors being able to punish deviation. Her 
conclusion is rather sceptical, suggesting that there are ‘significant obstacles’ to 
enforcing standards.80 However, the two assessments do not need to be contradictory 
if the different groups of actors are taken into consideration. Among H-doers the 
salience of the anti-mercenary norm is high and are effectively governed, while the 
opposite is true for L-doers. In short, the norm’s salience varies across the two groups, 
yet there is no attempt to engage in a bargaining game and to find a new consensus. As 
a consequence, the market for force has become segmented. On the one hand there is a 
legitimate segment which is government by widely accepted rules, and on the other 
hand there is an illegitimate segment where the exchange of combat services is a 
normality.  
Tacit collusion between H-doers and L-doers may have wider implications, and 
may not be limited to the anti-mercenary norm.81 With the rise of revisionist states and 
dwindling influence of liberal states in the international system, increasing non-
compliance on important international norms such as human rights, freedom of the 
press, military intervention, or climate change is already a reality. Faced with non-
compliance and an increasing inability to enforce norms, H-doers may become more 
and more willing to tacitly collude with L-doers. This may be the path through which 
the normative foundation of the liberal international order becomes substantially 
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